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Abstract
The availability of technological means to enhance and repair human cognitive function raises
questions about the perceived morality of their use. In this study, we administered a survey to
the public in which subjects were asked to report how willing they would be to enhance and/or
repair specific cognitive abilities. Among 894 responders, we found that subjects were more
willing to use technologies to repair other people than themselves, and especially to enhance
or repair functions more “core” to authentic identity in others. Subjects’ ratings of the moral
acceptability of specific uses was related to their reported willingness to use brain stimulation.
These findings suggest that the public endorses an altruistic approach to applying brain stimu-
lation for cognitive gains. Further, this study establishes a basis to guide moral psychological
studies of cognitive modification and social processes that guide attitudes toward and uses of
brain stimulation.
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Introduction
Humans enhance cognitive functions through physical and cognitive training [1], pharmaceuti-
cals [2], and invasive and noninvasive neuromodulation [3]. With increasing public availability
of potentially effective cognitive modification tools has emerged a “do-it-yourself” (DIY) non-
invasive brain stimulation movement [4]. Within the DIY movement, people use technologies
such as transcranial direct current stimulation in attempts to treat depression and other psy-
chological problems or to enhance cognition [5]. Beyond this movement, we can reasonably
anticipate that with the combination of easy access to home manufacturing technologies [6] and
open-source information that laypersons may build ever-more effective tools for neuromodula-
tion at home. In addition, technologies such as deep-brain stimulation provide powerful invasive
means to influence human cognition [7]. In this context, researchers and ethicists have debated
how we should study public use of brain stimulation [8, 4, 9], communicate information with
consumers [10], prioritize who receives interventions [11], and regulate available technologies
[12, 4].
Experiments suggest that the public has a sophisticated perspectives and sensitivity to major
debates in cognitive enhancement research [13]. However, while the (DIY) culture is rapidly
growing with unique opportunities for scientific discovery [8, 4, 9], and more invasive tech-
niques are being applied for a variety of disorders, we know relatively little about public per-
spectives and moral appraisals about human enhancement techniques more broadly. Several
major variables could affect human willingness to use certain technologies to influence cog-
nition. Here, we focus on whether people are willing to use a hypothetical brain stimulation
technology to influence cognitive features that are more or less core to the “authentic self” [14].
We additionally examined whether subjects are more willing to repair or enhance features, and
more willing to influence others versus themselves. Finally, we considered the extent to which
judgments of moral acceptability were associated with the willingness to apply certain uses
in general. Examining these variables could begin to identify what guides intuitive judgments
about brain stimulation for cognition. It could further establish the contributions of moral eval-
uations to public attitudes about brain stimulation uses.
Some previous research points to the potential relevance of these variables. Research in-
vestigating consumers’ willingness to take pharmaceuticals indicated that young, healthy adults
were reluctant to enhance traits believed to be more fundamental to one’s self-identity (the
“authentic self”) than others [15, 16]. However, it is unknown whether similar preferences gen-
eralize to non-pharmaceutical interventions such as brain stimulation. In addition, individuals
may view interventions used to repair (i.e., therapeutically) rather than enhance performance
more acceptable than others [17] when moving individuals toward normative functioning. Fur-
ther, individuals may sometimes seek to gain performance advantages for themselves rather
than for others in well-controlled experimental contexts [18]. However, the extent to which this
applies to potentially advantageous or altruistic applications of brain stimulation has not been
examined. Moreover, moral acceptability – whether engaging in an action is thought to be the
right thing to do – was strongly related to the desire to legalize enhancement as opposed to
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personally taking the enhancement [15]. This suggests that individuals may engage in moral
reasoning when considering institutional action about enhancements, but not on limited uses
on an individual basis. However, whether moral evaluations contribute to willingness to apply
cognitive enhancement and repair more generally has not been thoroughly evaluated.
In a within-between subjects design, we examined individuals’ willingness to apply a lim-
ited supply of a hypothetical brain stimulation device called “Ceremode” to enhance or repair
cognitive features in themselves or others. We hypothesized that subjects would be less willing
to enhance or repair traits they perceive as more fundamental to “authentic” self-identity [15].
We further predicted that in the zero-sum vignettes, subjects would prioritize enhancing or re-
pairing cognitive functions in themselves rather than others. We anticipated that subjects would
be more willing to repair than enhance cognitive functions, and similarly willing to enhance
traits less fundamental (“peripheral”) to authentic identity in themselves and others, but more
willing to enhance more fundamental (“core”) traits in others. We expected moral acceptability
to be positively related to subjects likelihood ratings across conditions. Finally, we anticipated
that demographic variables associated with particular ideological positions could be associated
with willingness to apply certain uses. Specifically, we speculated that politically more con-
servative individuals would be less willing to enhance or repair individuals, and that this effect
would be partially mediated by Openness to Experience [19].
Open Science Framework Pre-registration
We are sensitive to increasing concerns about scientific transparency, academic honesty, the
influence of “perverse” incentives on researchers [20, 21], and the complexity of interactions
between variables that influence psychological research [22]. We considered it important to
constrain the focus of our work to test hypotheses that were discussed among the coauthors
ahead of time and only to test the predictions that we made before looking at any data. Thus,
prior to any data analysis, we pre-registered the current confirmatory hypotheses for this study
a priori in the Open Science Framework (www.osf.io). Thus, the primary results in the current
manuscript presents only the procedures and results proposed in our initially intended research
as protection against implicit or explicit researcher biases during data analysis.
Subjects
In two separate survey administrations (one each for the “self” and “other” conditions, between
subjects), 500 subjects for each condition were solicited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (M-
Turk). M-Turk allows researchers to collect high-quality data rapidly among demographically
diverse individuals [23]. The participants were required to have completed at least 100 tasks
previously and maintain at least a 95% approval rating on M-Turk. The study was approved by
the Institutional Review Board at the University of Pennsylvania and all participants provided
informed consent prior to participating in the study.
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Survey design
We administered two surveys (“self” and “other”): one to assess using technology on one’s self
(“self survey”) and another to assess using technologies on others (“other survey”). In these sur-
veys, we assessed the associations of three primary variables with subjects’ likelihood of using
a fictitious technology called “Ceremode” (see description below) to influence specific cogni-
tive functions. Within each survey, we asked subjects to consider whether they would enhance
or repair, specific cognitive functions that were selected to be either more core or peripheral
to authentic self-identity based on a previous study [15]. Then, we asked subjects to consider
how they would distribute Ceremode to affect specific cognitive functions in a zero-sum sce-
nario. Next, we asked subjects to rate the moral acceptability of specific uses of Ceremode.
Afterwards, we asked subjects to respond to items measuring demographic variables, personal-
ity, and political ideologies. Thus, the self/other condition was between subjects, whereas the
enhance/repair and core/peripheral factors were within subjects. Specific procedures for each
section are described below.
Self Survey design: giving Ceremode to the self This survey began with definitions of each
of 16 terms referring to specific cognitive functions from a prior study that established them as
more core or peripheral to human self-identity [15]. Specifically, we selected the eight most
“core” functions (Kindness, Empathy, Self-confidence, Mood, Motivation, Social Comfort, Re-
laxation, and Emotional Recovery) and the eight most “peripheral” functions (Reflexes, Rote
Memory, Wakefulness, Foreign language ability, Math ability, Episodic memory, Concentra-
tion, and Music ability).
Subjects were instructed to respond as follows:
“In a breakthrough discovery, scientists have created a brain stimulation device
called Ceremode that can be used on individuals to change cognitive abilities. There
are several different versions of Ceremode. Each version can affect only one type
of cognitive ability at a time without side effects. In addition, each version of Cere-
mode can be used in either healthy individuals or individuals with brain injuries to
change cognitive abilities.
Imagine that you are responsible for deciding whether to use Ceremode on
yourself to affect your cognitive functions. With this in mind, your task is
to read sentences describing the effects of each version of Ceremode. Then,
decide how likely you would be to give that version to yourself. Some versions
of Ceremode will be used to enhance cognitive functions while you are healthy.
Other versions of Ceremode will be used to repair cognitive functions if you suffer
a brain injury. You will rate each item from 1 (Extremely Unlikely) to 5 (Extremely
Likely). Importantly, you cannot receive every version of Ceremode because only
so many versions of each type of Ceremode exist. Considering that Ceremode
comes in a limited supply, please use the entire range from 1-5 when making your
decisions.”
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Then, we presented 32 items. Half of the items asked whether subjects would be likely to
enhance their functions while they are healthy, and half of the items asked whether subjects
would be likely to repair functions if they had brain injuries:
“This version of Ceremode can be used on you <while you are healthy/if you have
brain injuries> to <enhance/repair> cognitive abilities. If you are stimulated by
this Ceremode you will receive improved<cognitive function> with no side effects.
I would be −−−−− to give this version of Ceremode.”
If the prompt included “while you are healthy”, then it was always followed by “enhance”.
If the prompt included “if you have brain injuries”, then it was always followed by “repair”.
We included two attention checks in this portion of the survey. Each attention check stated:
“This is an attention check. If you are paying attention please select Extremely
Likely.”
For each item, subjects responded on a Likert scale from among the responses (1) Extremely
Unlikely; (2) Somewhat Unlikely; (3) Neutral; (4) Somewhat Likely; and (5) Extremely Likely.
The item order was presented uniformly at random for each participant.
Distributing Ceremode to the self with a zero-sum constraint After assessing subjects’
estimated likelihood of administering Ceremode to enhance or repair specific functions, we
asked individuals to distribute a limited number of Ceremode versions to enhance or repair
various cognitive functions (within subjects). That is, subjects were shown a list of various
cognitive functions and asked to distribute a limited number of units to the functions that they
would most want enhanced or repaired.
In the “enhance” condition, subjects were asked:
“Now imagine that you receive a special version of Ceremode. This version can
enhance your functions right now. It can enhance many functions. However, it
has a limited amount of energy, which affects how much you can enhance each
cognitive function. For example, you could set it to enhance all functions a little
bit, or a single function completely, or anywhere in between.
Please read the whole list carefully before making your choices and please use 16
total units of energy (that is, the total of energy across all items should equal 16).”
In the “repair” condition, subjects were asked:
“Now imagine that you receive a different special version of Ceremode. This ver-
sion can repair lost functions if you suffer a brain injury. It can repair many func-
tions. However, it also has a limited amount of energy, which affects how much
you can repair each cognitive function. For example, you could set it to repair all
functions a little bit, or a single function completely, or anywhere in between.
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Please read the whole list carefully before making your choices and please use 16
total units of energy (that is, the total of energy across all items should equal 16).”
Underneath the prompt for each condition, the subjects typed the number of units they would
allocate to each of the 16 cognitive functions into a box next to the name of each cognitive
function. Responses were fixed so that subjects had to allocate exactly 16 total units (i.e., the
sum of allocated units across all functions equaled 16) before proceeding.
Moral acceptability of using Ceremode on the self After assessing subjects’ distribution of
Ceremode to various cognitive functions, we asked the extent to which they thought specific
uses of this hypothetical technology on the self were morally acceptable.
For the enhance condition, we asked subjects:
“Now consider that there is no limit to how many versions of Ceremode you can
use to enhance your cognitive abilities. How morally acceptable are each of the
following uses of Ceremode to enhance your cognitive abilities right now?”
For the repair condition, we asked subjects:
“Now consider that there is no limit to how many versions of Ceremode you can use
to repair your cognitive abilities. How morally acceptable are each of the following
uses of Ceremode to repair your abilities if you suffer a brain injury?”
Then, for each of the two conditions, for each of the sixteen cognitive functions, subjects
were prompted with a series of items in a randomized order with the format:
“It is morally acceptable to <enhance/repair> your <cognitive function>.”
For each item, subjects responded on a Likert scale from among the responses (1) Strongly
disagree; (2) Somewhat disagree; (3) Neutral; (4) Somewhat agree, and (5) Strongly agree. The
item order was presented uniformly at random for each participant.
Other Survey design: giving Ceremode to others The survey measuring attitudes toward
other-enhancement was structured identically to the self survey, except that the instructions and
prompts were changed to ask a different sampel of individuals to think about using Ceremode
on others instead of themselves.
Moral acceptability of using Ceremode on others After assessing subjects’ distribution of
Ceremode, we asked the extent to which they thought specific uses of this hypothetical technol-
ogy on others were morally acceptable.
For the enhance condition, we asked subjects:
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“Now consider that there is no limit to how many versions of Ceremode you can use
to enhance cognitive abilities. How morally acceptable are each of the following
uses of Ceremode to enhance cognitive abilities in healthy individuals?”
For the repair condition, we asked subjects:
“Now consider that there is no limit to how many versions of Ceremode you can
use to repair cognitive abilities. How morally acceptable are each of the following
uses of Ceremode to repair abilities after individuals have suffered brain injuries?”
Then, for each of the two conditions, for each of the sixteen cognitive functions, subjects
were prompted with a series of items in a randomized order with the format:
“It is morally acceptable to <enhance/repair> your <cognitive function>.”
For each item, subjects responded on a Likert scale from among the responses (1) Strongly
disagree; (2) Somewhat disagree; (3) Neutral; (4) Somewhat agree, and (5) Strongly agree. The
item order was presented uniformly at random for each participant.
Big Five Inventory-10 (BFI-10) Following the Moral Acceptability section in each of the
enhance and repair conditions, subjects completed the BFI-10 to provide validated and time-
efficient measurements of the Big Five personality traits [24].
Neoliberal Beliefs Inventory (NBI) Subjects then completed the NBI [25], which is a reliable
and valid 25-item measure of neoliberal beliefs. The NBI contains four factors that entail beliefs
about system inequality, competition, personal wherewithal, and government interference.
Demographics Subjects reported their gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, income, field of
study, employment status, and political party. In addition, subjects reported their religious up-
bringing, current religious tradition, degree of religiosity, degree of spirituality, church or other
religious meeting attendance, time spent in religious/spiritual activities, relationship status, and
an reporting whether they thought human minds are more like computer or souls.
Statistical analyses
Analyses were conducted using multilevel modeling with maximum-likelihood estimation [?]
implemented in the lme4 v.1.1-9 [26] package of R version 3.2.1 [?]. This technique allows
for a classical regression analysis to be performed on repeated measures data by accounting for
the non-independence of observations collected from each participant in a within-subjects de-
sign, without resorting to computing separate regression equations for each subject [?, ?, ?].
Multilevel modeling also accounts for violations of the sphericity assumption by modeling
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heteroscedasticity in the data when necessary, improving statistical power over other meth-
ods commonly employed for analyzing repeated-measures data. Specifically, we examined the
Self/Other, Enhance/Repair, and Core/Peripheral variables as discrete independent variables,
age, education, and gender as covariates, and included random effects for subjects. We ex-
amined political affiliation and moral acceptability as independent variables in separate main
effects models to isolate these effects.
Results
Final sample A total of 1000 subjects enrolled to take the surveys, half for the “self survey”
and half for the “other survey”. In the self survey, we excluded 30 subjects who did not provide
complete data and an additional 21 subjects failed at least one attention check item and were
excluded. In the “other” survey, we excluded 31 subjects did not provide complete data and an
additional 17 subjects failed at least one attention check item. The final sample included 894
subjects, with 449 to the “self” survey and 445 to the “other” survey. The total sample consisted
of 443 females, a mean age of 37.4 years of age (SD = 11.55), and the modal education level
was a Bachelor’s degree.
Main effects The results of the main effects model can be observed in Table 1. Across the
sample, older individuals reported a lower willingness to use any kind of brain stimulation. Two
of the three primary independent variables (enhancement versus repair, and self versus other)
were significant. The degree of cognitive fundamentalness (“core” versus “peripheral”) was
not.
Table 1: Main effects model
Estimate Std. Error df t-value p
Intercept 4.214 0.126 898 33.223 <0.001
Age -1.137 0.002 889 -5.406 <0.001
Education -0.036 0.034 889 -1.053 0.293
Gender 0.020 0.048 889 0.412 0.680
Self/Other -0.129 0.048 889 -2.666 0.008
Core/Peripheral 0.006 0.013 2771 0.478 0.633
Enhance/Repair -0.396 0.013 2771 -30.387 <0.001
10
W
ill
in
g
n
e
s
s
Repair Enhance
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly
Agree
Figure 1: People are more willing to repair than enhance. Overall, subjects expressed rela-
tively increased willingness to use Ceremode to repair rather than enhance cognitive functions.
The top and bottom horizontal hash marks represent the maximum and minimum values, re-
spectively. The top and bottom of the box represent the third and first quartiles, respectively.
The thick horizontal line represents the median value in each condition. Circles represent the
condition means in the mixed effects model.
11
W
ill
in
g
n
e
s
s
Other Self
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly
Agree
Figure 2: People are more willing to influence others than themselves. Across all items,
subjects reported a tendency to use Ceremode on others than themselves. The top and bottom
horizontal hash marks represent the maximum and minimum values, respectively. The top and
bottom of the box represent the third and first quartiles, respectively. The thick horizontal line
represents the median value in each condition.
The results of the mixed effects model including interactions can be viewed in Table 2.
As anticipated, the self-/other factor interacted with the cognitive fundamentalness and en-
hance/repair factor. Specifically, subjects were especially more likely to report willingness
to use Ceremode to repair others than any other condition. In addition, they were more likely
to report willingness to repair rather than enhance themselves. Among the four conditions,
they were most willing to repair functions in others (See Fig. 3), and also especially willing to
enhance or repair core functions in others (See Fig. 4).
12
Table 2: Interaction model
Estimate Std. Error df t-value p
Intercept 4.214 0.126 908 33.385 <0.001
Age -1.137 0.002 889 -5.406 <0.001
Education -0.036 0.034 889 -1.053 0.293
Gender 0.020 0.048 889 0.412 0.680
Self/Other -0.191 0.052 1160 -3.705 <0.001
Core/Peripheral 0.179 0.018 2771 9.793 <0.001
Enhance/Repair -6.317 0.018 2771 -34.521 <0.001
Self/Other*Core/Peripheral -0.344 0.026 2771 -13.339 <0.001
Self/Other*Enhance/Repair 0.470 0.026 2771 18.185 <0.001
W
ill
in
g
n
e
s
s
Other Self
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly
Agree
Repair
Enhance
Figure 3: The significant interaction between the Self/Other and Enhance/Repair factors.
We observed that repair was favored over enhancement overall, and that this is especially the
case when considering to use Ceremode on others. Circles represent the condition means;
standard errors of the mean too small to observe at this scale.
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Figure 4: A significant interaction between Self/Other and Core/Peripheral factors. We
observed that subjects were similarly willing to use Ceremode to enhance or repair peripheral
features in themselves and others. However, subjects were much more willing to use Ceremode
to influence core features in others. Circles represent the condition means; standard errors of
the mean too small to observe at this scale.
Across all items, moral acceptability was positively related to the willingness to use Cer-
emode (See Table 3 and Fig. 5). Post hoc t-tests at the item level indicate that subjects
viewed repair to be more morally acceptable than enhancement overall (t(2771) = -13.14,
p < 1.0 × 10−16), affecting core functions to be more morally acceptable than peripheral
functions (t(2771) = -28.91, p < 1.0 × 10−16), and affecting themselves to be more morally
acceptable than others (t(2771) = 3.762, p < 0.001). Importantly, the median response for
each condition was to ”Agree” that uses were morally acceptable, suggesting that differences
between condition involve relative acceptability instead of acceptable versus unacceptable uses.
Table 3: Moral acceptability associations with willingness to use Ceremode
Estimate Std. Error df t-value p
Intercept 3.317 0.128 1037 25.838 <0.001
Age -0.120 0.002 889 -5.812 <0.001
Education -0.048 0.034 890 -1.418 0.156
Gender 0.001 0.047 890 0.021 0.983
Moral Acceptability 0.160 0.009 2737 18.297 <0.001
14
Disagree
Moral Acceptability
W
ill
in
g
n
e
s
s
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral Agree Strongly
Agree
Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly
Agree
Figure 5: Moral acceptability is related to willingness to use Ceremode. We observed a pos-
itive association between the moral acceptability of specific uses of Ceremode and willingness
to use Ceremode for each purpose. Circles represent means at each value of moral acceptability,
standard errors of the mean too small to observe at this scale.
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There was no significant relationship between political affiliation and the willingness of
individuals to enhance or repair cognitive functions (See Table 4). Additionally, there was no
significant relationship between neoliberalism and willingness to use Ceremode (See Table 5).
In addition, there was no significant interaction between openness to experience and core or
peripheral features (See Table 6)
Table 4: Main effects of political affiliation (Democrats as reference group)
Estimate Std. Error df t-value p
Intercept 3.997 0.129 887 30.891 <0.001
Age -0.012 0.002 887 -5.515 <0.001
Education -0.040 0.034 887 -1.165 0.244
Gender 0.024 0.048 887 0.497 0.619
Republican -0.034 0.062 887 -0.537 0.591
Independent -0.062 0.058 887 -1.070 0.285
Other 0.054 0.135 887 0.400 0.690
Table 5: Main effect of the neoliberalism summary score
Estimate Std. Error df t-value p
Intercept 3.842 0.152 889 25.215 <0.001
Age -0.012 0.002 889 -5.620 <0.001
Education -0.039 0.034 889 -1.125 0.261
Gender 0.016 0.048 889 0.335 0.738
Neoliberalism 0.044 0.028 889 -0.598 0.110
16
Table 6: Interaction model between openness to experience and trait fundamentalness
Estimate Std. Error df t-value p
Intercept 3.849 0.156 942 24.751 <0.001
Age -0.119 0.002 889 -5.622 <0.001
Education -0.040 0.034 889 -1.174 0.241
Gender 0.021 0.048 889 0.432 0.666
Core/Peripheral 0.087 0.053 2771 1.641 0.101
Openness 0.032 0.026 1027 1.259 0.208
Other -0.021 0.013 2771 -1.574 0.116
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Discussion
In self-report surveys measuring moral assessments of applications of brain stimulation on var-
ious cognitive functions, we found partial support for our hypotheses. Subjects were more
willing to repair than enhance cognitive functions overall. Moreover, the reported moral accept-
ability of specific uses of Ceremode was associated with willingness to use Ceremode for that
purpose. However, several results differed from our predictions. Contrary to our hypothesis,
subjects were more willing to use Ceremode on others than themselves. In addition, individuals
were most willing to repair rather than enhance core functions in others overall. Moreover, they
expressed similar willingness to use Ceremode to influence peripheral features in themselves
and others, but demonstrated willingness to influence the core features in others but not on
themselves.
Our findings suggest that moral evaluation contributes to willingness to use brain stimulation
in zero-sum scenarios. When given vignettes indicating that a hypothetical brain stimulation
technology comes in a limited supply, subjects prioritized repair over enhancement in alignment
with their moral judgments. However, overall willingness to use brain stimulation on core
or peripheral functions and on themselves rather than others was in the opposite direction of
ratings of moral acceptability. This suggests that moral evaluation may contribute to judgments
to repair over enhancing functions, but that that they override moral dispositions for the other
conditions. In the case of self versus other brain stimulation uses, significant main effects
were observed in opposite directions: subjects may believe it is somewhat more appropriate to
modify themselves, but report willingness to apply brain stimulation to others. Subject’s high
willingness to repair core functions in others may suggest that additional social dispositions
override certain moral intuitions. Research shows that moral commitments can dissociate from
moral judgments [27], and our current study suggests that it will be important to clarifying
links between core moral commitments, discrete moral judgments, hypothetical willingness,
and real-world behavior in brain stimulation uses. Because similar dissociations at the person-
level and policy level have been observed in attitudes toward pharmaceuticals for enhancement,
it is clear that systematic research should continue to assess specific moral attitudes and their
relationships to hypothetical willingness and actual behavior.
The most surprising finding – that individuals were more willing to influence others, and
specifically for core functions – bears special consideration. In general, we know little about
how the public views the potential resource distribution for cognitive enhancement. It is possible
that individuals in the current study were altruistically inclined to repair others’ “true” selves
when the self has been lost due to brain injury. Curiously, individuals were less inclined to
endorse repair of core functions for themselves. Speculatively, this could be due to the difficulty
in imagining what it is like to lose one’s own authentic, holistic sense of self (the “Mind’s I”
[28]), and the relatively easier task of being able to observe how others change due to injuries in
the public imagination or by experiences with friends and family. This potential link between
imaginability and willingness could be explicitly tested in future studies. An additional nuance
is worth noting: we did find some partial support for our prediction that individuals would favor
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self-enhancement for performance gains over others. Specifically, individuals were more likely
to enhance and repair peripheral features in themselves relative to others. Since some of these
“peripheral” features include those that are valuable in a performance-based economy (e.g.,
memory, concentration), it is possible that individuals may prioritize these uses for personal
gains over others. Examining individuals’ beliefs about the links between specific functions and
real-world outcomes could clarify this finding. Further, examining the relationships between
moral commitments and moral judgment [27] could help explain why some individuals favor
specific uses in themselves or others.
Interestingly, contrary to prior work in pharmaceuticals [15, 17], we did not find that indi-
viduals were less willing to influence traits more “core” to authentic identity with hypothetical
brain stimulation. This indicates that consumer intuitions may differ due to the hypothetical
mechanism of delivery. brain stimulation and pharmaceuticals can both be “neuromodulatory”
and influence cognition. However, brain stimulation is generally administered exogenously us-
ing electromagnetism, whereas pharmaceuticals are administered intra-orally and chemically
modulate metabolic, neural, and other cerebrovascular effects. Moreover, brain stimulation
predominantly emerged in the 1980s, whereas pharmaceutical manufacturing began in the late
1890s. This means that public awareness, acceptance, and reasoning about pharmaceuticals
has developed for many decades longer than for brain stimulation (though see [29] concerning
an exception through the 1920s). How sociocultural processes shape evaluation of the spe-
cific mechanisms of interventions and their public or professional acceptance could inform an
important new area of study for research pertinent to reasoning and public policy.
In this vein, our research contributes an important empirical basis from which research in-
forming public education, outreach, and policy could develop. Several groups have opined that
growing trends toward in brain stimulation could lead to issues with ethical and equitable dis-
tribution of clinical and enhancing or “neuroaesthetic” [30] uses of brain stimulation [11, 31].
Moreover, the public is more worried than enthusiastic about enhancement using invasive forms
of brain stimulation to enhance themselves [32]. There have also been efforts to educate and
caution at home brain stimulation users about unknown or harmful effects [10]. Thus, there
are several stakes amenable to empirical inquiry. The first concerns the effects of specific uses
of brain stimulation, where investigators must determine what functions are affected, to what
degree, and in what circumstances [33]. The second, depending on the first, concerns whether
and how ethical and equitable distribution are feasible [11]. The third, motivated by the cur-
rent work, concerns how objective facts about brain stimulation and the ethical and equitable
distribution of brain stimulation are viewed by the public and professional brain stimulation
practitioners. This latter issue has heretofore largely been subject to intensive conceptual dis-
cussions and opinions, despite the fact that the public is demonstrably sensitive to many of the
key debates and stakes[16]. More pressingly, the objective study of public and professional
attitudes and behaviors toward brain stimulation is required to make informed decisions about
how these phenomena effect the actual practices of brain stimulation, and how we might seek
to influence these processes [9, 34, 4, 5].
Concerning potential interventions targeting public or professional attitudes toward brain
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stimulation, our findings suggest at least two directions worth immediate inquiry. First, as
described above, studying how judgments are influences by an intervention’s mechanism of ac-
tion and individuals’ understanding of them and their objective effects is important. Second,
we should seek to connect judgments about interventions such as brain stimulation to broader
research in human decision making [35], neuroeconomics [36], and moral reasoning [37]. Each
of these fields are successfully clarifying how specific neurocognitive traits, biases, and adap-
tive processes interact to produce more or less rational and emotionally valenced responses and
shape beliefs. While we focus on survey responses to zero-sum vignettes, we can also begin
to connect judgments about self enhancement and repair to cognitive models, identify dimen-
sions that can influence specific judgments, and explore analogous judgments of willingness
in nonzero sum scenarios. This would let us test how moral acceptability may or may not be
influenced to change judgments about brain stimulation, and whether other cognitive-emotional
processes contribute and can be modified. Indeed, we found that individuals viewed affecting
themselves with brain stimulation to be more morally acceptable, but were overall more will-
ing to use brain stimulation on others to repair core functions essential to empathic, altruistic
functioning.
Limitations Several limitations to the current study can and should be addressed with future
research. The current study is subject to the limitations inherent in self-report survey research.
We cannot identify causal influences with the current study. In addition, the structure of the
survey did not allow us to test for possible order dependencies between reports of willingness
and moral acceptability since the latter always followed the former. Future studies could ma-
nipulate moral cuing at the survey section or item level to test whether moral primacy influences
willingness to use brain stimulation for specific purposes. In addition, it is well established that
reverse coding and item-level issues can influence ratings [38]. Moreover, while we uncovered
several significant main effects and interactions, there was notable variation in responses that
was not accounted for by the variables we examined. An interesting future direction would be to
examine item-level effects both in terms of accurately assessing attitudes and identifying targets
for influencing judgments. In addition, while we included a specific mechanism of injury in our
repair condition, other mechanisms of injury could be investigated as a dimension of interest.
Another salient variable is the religious identity of individuals; in a public survey regarding
invasive technologies, religious individuals are more reluctant than atheists and agnostics to be
willing to receive enhancements [32, 5]. Religious affiliation may interact with the variables
explored here, including underlying moral evaluations. Finally, while prior research suggests
that survey data collected via Mechanical Turk can be representative of data acquired in person
[23, 39], it is unknown whether this generalizes to the current context.
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Conclusion
Uses of brain stimulation are increasingly available, but empirical studies regarding about public
attitudes and judgments have lagged behind opinions and policy. The current study can begin
an effort to understand judgments and moral dispositions toward cognitive enhancement and
repair. Our results suggest that while brain stimulation uses tend to be morally acceptable,
the degree of acceptability informs its use to repair functions core to identity in others, but is
at odds with the willingness to endorse specific uses. Future efforts can begin to apply these
findings to contexts beyond brain stimulation to inform human judgment and reasoning more
generally. We can begin to develop a mature understanding of moral judgments regarding the
use of technologies to repair and enhance various cognitive functions with the aim of informing
public and professional policy, education, and biomedical interventions.
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